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Private Law, Conflict of Laws, and a Lex Mercatoria of StandardsDevelopment Organizations
Jorge L. Contreras*
1. Introduction: Standards, SDOs and Conflict of Laws
The development of technical standards such as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth and USB has
been conducted largely within private industry associations known as
standards-development organizations or SDOs. While an SDO provides an open
forum for standards development, the technical work of standardization is
generally carried out by representatives of firms having expertise in the relevant
technical field: namely, technology developers and manufactures of standardized
products, with the occasional involvement of governmental entities and civil
society members.
The standards that emerge from SDOs enable products manufactured by
different producers around the world to interoperate without significant user
intervention. Large swaths of the global technology infrastructure not only
depend on, but are literally defined by, these standards. As such, SDOs have been
characterized as private regulators with significant public functions.1 And while
a range of national and international legal regimes -- including trade law,
antitrust and competition law and national standardization regulations -- impose
constraints on SDO behavior, generally requiring that they observe minimal “due
process” requirements, the structure and governance of SDOs remains primarily
a function of private ordering among their members.2
SDOs assume a range of forms, from non-profit corporations to trade
associations to contractual consortia to international non-governmental
organizations.3 In each of these cases, the rules that govern the standardization
process, as well as the rights and responsibilities of SDO participants, are
codified in written instruments known variously as bylaws, memoranda of
understanding, membership agreements, operating procedures, and the like.
These policy instruments specify the procedures to be used in proposing,
developing, and approving technical standards, as well as means for resolving
disputes among SDO participants and the manner in which the SDO itself is
governed (e.g., through elected or appointed bodies having specified authority).
Jorge L. Contreras is Professor of Law at the University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law. The author is
grateful to Anna Beckers, Tim Lytton, Rob van Gestel, Paul Verbruggen, Dan Wielsch and the other
participants at the Regulating Private Regulators conference held at Tilburg University in May 2018, and the
2018 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference (IPSC) at University of California, Berkeley, for their helpful
comments and feedback on this paper.
1 See J. L. CONTRERAS, “From Private Ordering to Public Law: The Legal Framework Governing StandardsEssential Patents”, 30. Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 2017, p. (211); T. BÜTHE & W. MATTLI, The New
Global Rulers. The Privatization of Regulation in the World Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press
2011).
2 For an in-depth review of the exogenous legal constraints affecting SDOs, see J.A. BARON et al., “Making the
Rules: The Governance of Standard Development Organizations and their Policies on Intellectual Property
Rights”, JRC Science for Policy Report at § 4.1 (2019).
3 See, generally, B. BIDDLE, “No Standard for Standards: Understanding the ICT Standards-Development
Ecosystem” in J. Contreras (ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of Technical Standardization Law, Volume I:
Competition, Antitrust and Patents (New York: Cambridge University Press 2017), pp. 17-28 (discussing
ecosystem of standards development).
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Despite the international composition of SDO membership, each SDO is also
organized as a legal entity in a particular jurisdiction (e.g., a U.S. state, a
European country, or another jurisdiction). As such, different SDO’s policies are
subject to a range of national laws.4 Likewise, when disputes regarding SDO
policy are litigated in national courts, different national laws are applied to the
adjudication of those disputes.5 While the application of national law to private
undertakings may, at first glance, seem unremarkable, it has presented
unanticipated and difficult issues in the context of SDOs. Several factors have
contributed to these difficulties. First, many SDOs have policies covering
identical concepts, such as the requirement to license certain patents on terms
that are “fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory” (FRAND). Yet the national
laws governing these SDO policies, as well as judicial approaches to contract
interpretation and construction, may differ significantly.6 Second, many disputes
concerning SDO policies are adjudicated in jurisdictions other than those whose
laws govern the SDO’s policies, requiring different courts to make decisions on
matters of foreign law. What’s more, none of those courts coordinate their
decisions or legal interpretations, giving rise to a cacophony of different
interpretations of virtually the same SDO policy provisions.
This interpretive disharmony has created uncertainty in the marketplace and
unpredictability in the resolution of disputes.7 The central question raised by
this article is whether a uniform body of interpretations of SDO policy provisions
can be developed based on industry practice and understanding, rather than the
application of national law. In essence, a lex mercatoria, or common lexicon, of
technical standardization. As such, the privately derived understandings of
participants in the standard-setting process can supersede, and be adopted into,
national law, just as private models of governance came to supersede applicable
legal regulations in the area of mercantile law and other contexts.8

See T. BARTLEY, “Transnational Governance as the Layering of Rules: Intersections of Public and Private
Standards”, 12. Theoretical Inquiries in Law 2011, p. (517), at 521 (“implementation of […] standards always
occurs within a particular nation-state, where domestic law still holds sway”).
5 For a summary of FRAND-related litigation around the world, see C. PENTHEROUDAKIS & J. A. BARON, Licensing
Terms of Standard Essential Patents: A Comprehensive Analysis of Cases. JRC Science for Policy Report EUR
28302 (2017). This paper focuses largely on cases and disputes in the U.S. and Europe (principally UK and
Germany), as these are the jurisdictions that have seen the greatest level of FRAND litigation.
6 See, e.g., P. VERBRUGGEN, "Private Regulatory Standards in Commercial Contracts: Questions of Compliance",
in: R. Brownsword, R. van Gestel & H. Micklitz (eds), Contract and Regulation: A Handbook on New Methods
of Law Making in Private Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2017), pp. 284-322, at 312 (“what normative
theory a court will apply [to interpret a contract] will of course depend on law applicable to the contract
under the rules of private international law”).
7 This disharmony has been noted as a feature of international legal regimes, more generally. See B. M.
CREMADES & S. L. PLEHN, “The New Lex Mercatoria and the Harmonization of the Laws of International
Commercial Transactions” 2. Boston University International Law Journal 1984, p. (317), at 320 (“today’s
nations realize that piecemeal regulation of international commerce through the application of independent
national laws impedes the growth of international trade”).
8 See, e.g., BARTLEY (n 4), at 518-19 (reviewing literature on private governance as filling regulatory voids in
areas such as labor and environment). See n 75, infra, and accompanying text, discussing assimilation of lex
mercatoria into national commercial law.
4
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2. SDO Policies – Patents and FRAND
In recent years, one of the most contentious areas of SDO rulemaking has
concerned intellectual property, particularly with regard to patents that are
considered “essential” for a product to comply with a standard (so-called
“standards-essential patents” or “SEPs”).9 There is a large and varied theoretical
literature concerning the potential effects that SEPs may have on markets for
standards-compliant products.10 One of the principal areas of debate concerns
whether SEP owners can and do “hold-up” the market by demanding excessive
royalty rates after a standard has been widely adopted and manufacturers have
made substantial capital investments in the standardized technology (thus
becoming “locked-in”).11 Another potential issue is “royalty stacking,” which, as
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has explained, can occur “when a
standard implicates numerous patents, perhaps hundreds, if not thousands,”
each of which can bear a royalty and which “may become excessive in the
aggregate.”12
Many SDOs have adopted policies designed to mitigate the threats of patent holdup and stacking. These policies fall into two general categories which are not
mutually exclusive: disclosure policies and licensing policies.13 Disclosure
policies require SDO participants to disclose SEPs that they hold, generally prior
to the approval of a relevant standard. Licensing policies require SEP holders to
grant manufacturers of standardized products licenses on terms that are either
royalty-free or bear royalties that are “fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory”
(FRAND).14
Initially, these policies were relatively brief and abstract, requiring, for example,
only that “[s]tandards should not include items whose production is covered by
patents unless the patent holder agrees to and does make available to any
interested and qualified party a license on reasonable terms . . .”15 These loosely
specified policies remained in effect through the 1990s when they began to
attract greater scrutiny from litigants and courts. The situation came to a head in
2003, when semiconductor designer Rambus, Inc. avoided liability for failing to

A patent is generally considered to be “essential” to a standard if the claims of the patent must be infringed
by any product that complies with the standard. See, generally, J. L. CONTRERAS, “Essentiality and StandardsEssential Patents” in CONTRERAS (n 3), pp. 209-230 (discussing essentiality).
10 See, e.g., J. L. CONTRERAS, “Technical Standards, Standard-Setting Organizations and Intellectual Property: A
Survey of the Literature (with an Emphasis on Empirical Approaches)” in P. S. MENELL & D. SCHWARTZ (eds.),
Research Handbook on the Economics of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. II — Analytical Methods (forthcoming
2019), § II.E-G.
11 See, e.g., J. FARRELL, ET AL., “Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up”, 74. Antitrust Law Journal 2007, p.
(603), at 616; M. LEMLEY & C. SHAPIRO, “Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking”, 85 Texas Law Journal 2007, p.
(1991); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights:
Promoting Innovation and Competition 2007, p 34-35.
12 Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
13 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Standards Development Patent Policy Manual 31–85 (Jorge L. Contreras ed.,
2007) (detailed catalog of SDO policy terms); M. A. LEMLEY, “Intellectual Property Rights and StandardSetting Organizations”, 90. California Law Review 2002, p. (1889) (survey of SDO policy provisions).
14 See ABA Patent Policy Manual (n 13), at 56–67.
15 Am. Standards Assn., Procedures of American Standards Association, Sec. 11 (1959).
9
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disclose patents essential to an SDO’s standards because, the court held, the
SDO’s patent policy suffered from “a staggering lack of defining details.”16
Critiques such as this, together with increasing litigation among SDO
participants, led several prominent SDO to revamp their patent policies in the
early- and mid-2000s.17 Some of the amendments adopted by SDOs were
controversial. For example, in 2006 the VMEBus Standards Association (“VITA”)
amended its patent policy to require advance (ex ante) disclosure of patent
licensing terms and royalty rates, a requirement that generated significant
opposition from patent holders.18 Two other SDOs, the European
Telecommunications Standardisation Institute (ETSI) and the Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standards Association (IEEE-SA), also
considered such a requirement during this time period but faced significant
internal opposition and eventually adopted a voluntary, rather than a
mandatory, ex ante disclosure policy.19 More recently, SDOs have continued to
experiment with policy changes, most notably in 2015, when IEEE-SA sought to
clarify certain aspects of its FRAND licensing commitment and limited the right
of SEP holders to seek injunctive relief against manufacturers of standardized
products.20 As a result, IPR policies at the most active SDOs in the information
and communications technology (ICT) sector have become both complex and
controversial, while at the same time remaining intentionally vague about key
policy terms such as “reasonable” and “nondiscriminatory”.
3. SDO Policy Disputes
Given the inherent vagueness of most SDO FRAND commitments, parties
concerned about IPR sometimes disagree over the meaning of such
commitments. Many of these disagreements relate to the level of royalties that
may be demanded by a SEP holder in compliance with its FRAND commitment.
There are countless details regarding the calculation of royalty rates that can
cause such disagreements, including the appropriate “base” against which the
royalty is calculated,21 whether different rates should apply to sales in different
countries, whether adjustments should be made based on the volume sold by the
manufacturer, and whether the value of the SEP holder’s patents should be
assessed in light of the overall number of patents covering a standard or on an
individual basis. Disagreements also arise over the “non-discrimination” prong
16 Rambus,

Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
quantitative analyses of these policy changes, see J.TSAI & J. D. WRIGHT, “Standard Setting, Intellectual
Property Rights, and the Role of Antitrust in Regulating Incomplete Contracts”, 80 Antitrust Law Journal
2015, p. (157), at 159–160 and A. LAYNE-FARRAR, “Proactive or Reactive? An Empirical Assessment of IPR
Policy Revisions in the Wake of Antitrust Actions”, 59. Antitrust Bulletin 2014, p. (373).
18 See J. L. CONTRERAS, “Technical Standards and Ex Ante Disclosure: Results and Analysis of an Empirical
Study”, 53. Jurimetrics 2013, p. (163), at 172–75 (describing the VITA policy amendments).
19 Ibid.
20 See M. A. LINDSAY & K. KARACHALIOS, “Updating a Patent Policy: The IEEE Experience”, CPI Antitrust
Chronicle, Mar. 2015.
21 E.g., is a percentage royalty charged against the price of the end product (e.g., a smartphone) or against
the chip or component that actually embodies the standardized technology (e.g., the Wi-Fi or radio chip
used in a smartphone). In technical terms, the question often posed is whether a SEP holder’s royalty is
charged against the value of the smallest saleable patent practicing unit (SSPPU) or the entire market value
of the end product (EMV). See, e.g., Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc. (n 12), at 1020.
17 For
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of the FRAND commitment, with parties clashing over whether a SEP holder’s
charges may vary based on the uses to which the end customer puts a
standardized product, whether a SEP holder may choose to license only at a
particular level in the supply chain (e.g., end product manufacturers rather than
component manufacturers), whether royalty rates may vary based on the size or
market or country of the manufacturer, and whether a SEP holder has any
latitude to charge different rates to differently-situated licensees.22
Finally, in addition to the financial terms of SEP licenses, disagreements may
arise over the appropriateness and scope of various non-financial terms such as
requirements of reciprocal licensing, mandatory grant-back licenses, and
defensive suspension.23 The greatest irony of this fractious system is that its goal
is standardization. And while interoperability and standardization have been
achieved to a significant degree on the technological front, the policy and legal
landscape in this area has become increasingly fragmented.
4. Public versus Private Law Enforcement
Given this fertile ground for disagreement, an increasing number of formal
disputes have arisen regarding the meaning of FRAND commitments and a
growing number of courts and arbitration tribunals around the world have been
called upon to interpret them.24 In these disputes, a clear intellectual divide has
emerged over the most suitable legal mechanisms for enforcing such
commitments. On one hand, if standard setting is a public activity, it may warrant
traditional “public law” regulation. On the other hand, if standard setting is
viewed as an inherently private activity, standardization may be more aptly
regulated through self-policing and private law mechanisms.
A number of governmental enforcement agencies around the world have
supported the application of competition and antitrust law to police private
breaches of commitments made within SDOs.25 As the U.S. FTC recently noted,
“[w]hile not every breach of a FRAND licensing obligation will give rise to
[antitrust] concerns, when such a breach tends to undermine the standardsetting process and risks harming American consumers, the public interest
demands action rather than inaction.”26 An approach to FRAND commitments
grounded in competition law is also prevalent in Europe, where the dominant
analysis arises under the competition analysis set out by the CJEU in Huawei v.
ZTE,27 and where the UK High Court (Patent) in Unwired Planet v. Huawei28

See, generally, J. L. CONTRERAS & A. LAYNE-FARRAR, “Non-Discrimination and FRAND Commitments” in
CONTRERAS (n 3), pp. 186-208.
23 See, generally, ABA Patent Policy Manual (n 13).
24 See PENTHEROUDAKIS & BARON (n 5) (cataloging FRAND litigation around the world).
25 For an overview of these actions, see J. L. CONTRERAS, “The Global Standards Wars: Patent and Competition
Disputes
in
North
America,
Europe
and
Asia”
(Apr.
2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3106090.
26. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement of the Federal Trade Commission on In the Matter of Robert Bosch GmbH,
FTC File Number 121-0081 (Nov. 26, 2012).
27 CJEU 16 July 2015, C-170/13, Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v. ZTE Corp. and ZTE Deutschland GmbH,
ECLI:EU:C:2015:477.
28 [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat) (Apr. 5, 2017), aff’d [2018] EWCA Civ. 2344 (23 Oct. 2018).
22
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evaluated numerous aspects of the SEP holder’s FRAND commitment through a
lens of competition rather than contract law.29
On the other side of this debate, the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division
has recently adopted the position that antitrust enforcement and remedies
should be used only sparingly in the context of standard setting, and that
traditional private law remedies such as contract are preferable for policing
compliance with FRAND commitments.30 Some commentators have also argued
that private legal remedies (contract and tort) should suffice to redress most
issues arising in standard setting, and that a resort to public law remedies
(antitrust) is both unnecessary and counterproductive.31 I, too, believe that while
antitrust and competition law remedies must remain available to address
instances of deception and other forms of abusive conduct, the essential
contours of SDO policies and FRAND commitments, which at their root are
privately ordered arrangements among parties, can only be discerned through
the application of private law mechanisms.32 As I have written previously,
“Despite the public nature of standards development, the most efficient and
equitable way to resolve disputes regarding the conduct of participants in the
standardization process may be to focus on the scope and nature of the parties’
privately ordered arrangements.”33 That is, the adjudicatory focus should be on
what the parties actually intended by the language of the commitments that they
made. Accordingly, the focus of this paper is on the application of private law,
particularly contract law, to SDO policy interpretation and enforcement.
5. National Law and SDO Policies – The Accidents of Geography
By their nature as legal entities, most SDOs are established in a particular legal
jurisdiction. For example, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is
based in Geneva, Switzerland, the European Telecommunications
Standardisation Institute (ETSI) is based in Sophia-Antipolis, France, the
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standards Association (IEEE-SA)
is based in New York, New York, USA, and the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF) is based in Reston, Virginia, USA. The foundational legal documents
establishing each of these SDOs are thus drafted according to the laws of the
SDO’s home jurisdiction and are often filed with relevant state and national
business registries.

See J. L. CONTRERAS, “Global Markets, Competition and FRAND Royalties: The Many Implications of Unwired
Planet v. Huawei”, 16. Antitrust Source 2017, August 2017.
30 Asst. Atty. Gen. Antitrust Div., U.S. Dept. Justice, MAKAN DELRAHIM, “Take it to the Limit: Respecting
Innovation Incentives in the Application of Antitrust Law”, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery at the USC
Gould School of Law, Nov. 10, 2017, https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1010746/download.
31. See B. H. KOBAYASHI & J. D. WRIGHT, “Federalism, Substantive Preemption, and Limits on Antitrust: An
Application to Patent Holdup”, 5. Journal of Competition Law & Economics 2009, p. (469), at 506-516
(discussing the comparative advantage of tort and contract law in regulating breaches of FRAND
commitments); see also H. HOVENKAMP, “Antitrust and the Patent System: A Reexamination”, 76. Ohio State
Law Journal 2015, p. (467), at 555 (“Fundamentally, these are problems best addressed through the patent
system rather than by antitrust law”).
32 See J. L. CONTRERAS (n 1).
33 Ibid, at 230.
29
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Likewise, the policy documents setting forth the rules and procedures of each of
these SDOs purports to be governed by the laws of a particular legal jurisdiction,
usually the home jurisdiction of the SDO. Thus, ETSI declares that its IPR policy
“shall be governed by the laws of France.”34 Other SDOs such as IEEE-SA do not
specify the particular jurisdiction whose laws govern its policy documents, but
courts interpreting those documents – particularly U.S. courts -- interpret them
in accordance with their general understandings of local law. Thus, on top of the
intricacies of the written rules governing SDO participation, a further layer of
complexity is introduced by the national and state laws that provide the
analytical and enforcement framework around these rules.
The application of specific national laws and modes of legal interpretation to
already complex SDO policies has introduced an additional level of
unpredictability to the interpretation of SDO policies, particularly surrounding
FRAND commitments. For example, in Apple v. Motorola, a federal district court
sitting in Wisconsin was required to determine whether the SEP holder,
Motorola, violated its contractual obligation to offer a FRAND license to Apple. In
assessing Motorola’s obligation under IEEE’s patent policy, the court observed
that “Neither party undertakes an adequate choice of law analysis with respect
to claims concerning IEEE, and both sides cite variously to Wisconsin, New York
and Illinois law in support of their respective positions.”35 To resolve the matter,
the court determined that there was no conflict among the laws of New York,
Illinois and Wisconsin with respect to the relevant issues in the case, and thus
proceeded to apply the laws of Wisconsin, though neither party had any material
relationship with the state of Wisconsin.36
Even more striking have been the efforts of courts to apply French law to the
interpretation of ETSI’s patent policy. In Apple v. Motorola, the same Wisconsin
court, turning to Motorola’s FRAND obligations under ETSI’s patent policy, based
its interpretation of French law governing the ETSI policy on a French law
professor’s affidavit submitted on behalf of one party, and the other party’s
excerpt from an English language treatise on French contract law.37 With these
resources in hand, the court appears to rely on the expert’s assertion that French
law “requires the same general elements” for contract formation as Wisconsin
law, and makes little effort to apply French statutory law to the case.38 In
Unwired Planet v. Huawei39, the UK High Court (Patent) makes a significantly
greater effort to understand and interpret the French law applicable to ETSI’s
patent policy, thoughtfully probing the arguments of both parties’ experts over
ETSI, Rules of Procedure, 29 Nov. 2017, Annex 6, Sec. 12.
886 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1082 (W.D. Wis. 2012). Interestingly, the state of Wisconsin bore no relationship
whatsoever to the parties or the case. The case was originally brought in Illinois, given Motorola’s Chicago
headquarters. Yet for case management reasons, the case was bifurcated, with one set of issues (those
concerning patent infringement) scheduled to be heard by the court in Chicago, and another set of issues
(those concerning contractual matters) assigned to be heard in the neighboring federal district in
Wisconsin.
36 Ibid.
37 886 F. Supp. 2d at 1082.
38 Ibid., at 1083.
39 [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat) (Apr. 5, 2017).
34
35
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many pages of the opinion.40 A similar effort was made by the U.S. district court
in TCL v. Ericsson based on competing affidavits of the parties’ French law
experts.41 Yet one must wonder how consistent and accurate these renditions of
French law in Wisconsin, California and the U.K. can be, especially when based
on nothing more than the advocacy of paid experts.
U.S. law introduces further complexities to the interpretation and analysis of SDO
FRAND commitments that do not translate well to other countries. For example,
in the U.S. the primary statutory measure of damages for patent infringement is a
“reasonable royalty”.42 For the past several decades, the calculation of
reasonable royalty damages in the U.S. has generally followed the 15-factor
“hypothetical negotiation” framework established in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S.
Plywood Corp.43 Because FRAND commitments speak in terms of a “reasonable”
royalty, several U.S. courts have sought to determine the appropriate level of
royalties under a FRAND commitment utilizing traditional methodologies for
determining patent damages, including the Georgia-Pacific hypothetical
negotiation framework. However, because this framework assumes that the
patent holder and the infringer have no pre-existing relationship, many of the
assumptions underlying this analysis do not apply in cases involving FRANDencumbered SEPs. This inconsistency has been pointed out in several cases. In
Microsoft v. Motorola, for example (in which the Georgia-Pacific analysis was
applied to a FRAND commitment made to ITU, notwithstanding the fact that ITU
is a Geneva-based SDO with no acknowledgement of U.S. law), the court
expressly modified twelve of the Georgia-Pacific factors when conducing its
FRAND analysis.44 Likewise, in Ericsson v. D-Link, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit criticized the use of several Georgia-Pacific factors when
calculating royalties subject to a [F]RAND commitment. These criticisms suggest
that the Georgia-Pacific framework is not well-suited to the determination of
royalty levels complying with FRAND requirements even with respect to FRAND
commitments made to U.S. SDOs, let alone non-U.S. SDOs such as ITU and ETSI.
And, not surprisingly, courts outside the U.S. have not used the Georgia-Pacific
analysis when interpreting SDO FRAND commitments.
Other examples of potential jurisdictional divergence exist. For example,
jurisdictions may differ in how they treat a FRAND commitment when the
original SDO participant that made it transfers the underlying SEP to a third
party. Do such commitments travel with patents, binding their new owners, or
are they binding only on the original promisor? Likewise, a SEP holder commits
to an SDO that it will grant licenses to potential implementers of a standard on
FRAND terms. But the implementer and SEP holder lack “privity of contract”, so
if the SEP holder breaches its commitment, the implementer must bring suit
against the SEP holder as a “third party beneficiary” of the SDO-SEP holder
commitment. Under U.S. law, courts have long recognized third party beneficiary
claims, and at least two federal district courts have adopted this theory with
[2017] EWHC 711 at paras 103-146.
TCL v Ericsson (C.D. Cal. 2018).
42 35 U.S.C. § 284.
43 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp. (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
40
41
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respect to FRAND commitments.44 However, application of the third-party
beneficiary doctrine to FRAND commitments presents doctrinal challenges, both
in the U.S. and elsewhere.45 In fact, several countries have never recognized the
doctrine, and in the U.K. it has been adopted by statute but was not recognized
under the common law.46
Given these and other issues, including the fact that some key questions in the
U.S. are determined by a lay jury, some non-U.S. courts have begun to distance
themselves from the reasoning of U.S. cases. The most pronounced example of
this distancing occurs in Unwired Planet, in which the U.K. court expressly rejects
several touchstones of SDO policy analysis developed in the U.S. For example,
both courts47 and enforcement agencies48 in the U.S. have concluded that a
FRAND royalty should reflect the ex ante value of a patented technology, without
considering the added value attributable to the adoption of the technology in a
standard.49 Yet the court in Unwired Planet, while acknowledging these prior
analyses, expressly parts ways with its U.S. counterparts with little explanation.50
Similarly, the UK court in Unwired Planet pronounces that there is but a single
FRAND rate for any given licensing transaction, explicitly deviating from the
approach taken by the U.S. court in Microsoft v. Motorola, in which a range of
FRAND rates was determined.51
The national law overlay on SDO-related commitments thus introduces
numerous inconsistencies to the analysis of SDO policies and FRAND
commitments. First, it is often unclear which body of law to apply to a given SDO
policy. Second, even if there is no disagreement over the correct body of law, the
interpretation of that law may be based on scant knowledge and experience (e.g.,
applying French law in Wisconsin). Third, the particular analytical tools of one
jurisdiction (e.g., the U.S. Georgia-Pacific framework) will not necessarily be
44Microsoft

Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1002–03 (W.D. Wash. 2012); Apple, Inc. v. Motorola
Mobility, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1085 (W.D. Wis. 2012).
45 For a detailed discussion of the third party beneficiary theory as applied to FRAND commitments, see J. L.
CONTRERAS, “A Market Reliance Theory for FRAND Commitments and Other Patent Pledges”, Utah Law
Review 2015, p.(479) at 508-514. ; J. G. SIDAK, “A FRAND Contract’s Intended Third Party Beneficiary, 1.
Criterion J. Innovation 2016, p. (1001). Cf. VERBRUGGEN (n 6), at p. 317-320 (discussing difficulty of enforcing
codes of conduct embodied in supply chain agreements under third party beneficiary theory in the U.S.).
46 See V. V. PALMER, The Paths to Privity: A History of Third Party Beneficiary Contracts at English Law San
Francisco: Austin & Winfield 1992), p. 165–167 (1992) and U.K. Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act
1999. See also M.A. EISENBERG, “Third-Party Beneficiaries”, 92. Columbia Law Review 1992, p. 1358, 13641365; J. HALLEBEEK, “Contracts for a Third Party Beneficiary: A Brief Sketch from the Corpus Iuris to Present
Day Civil Law” (Working Paper 2007), https://research.vu.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/2330470.
47 Ericsson v. D-Link, 773 F.3d at 1232; In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 903,
907 (N.D. Ill. 2013); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 60233 at *44 (W.D. Wash., Apr. 25, 2013), aff’d 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015).
48 FED. TRADE COMM’N, The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies with Competition, p.
22-23 (2011) (“A definition of [F]RAND based on the ex ante value of the patented technology at the time
the standard is chosen is necessary for consumers to benefit from competition among technologies to be
incorporated into the standard”).
49 See, e.g., FARRELL, ET AL. (n 11), at 603.
50 [2017] EWHC 711, at para 97. For a more detailed discussion of this aspect of the Unwired Planet decision,
see CONTRERAS (n 29), at 8.
51 Compare Unwired Planet, [2017] EWHC 711 at para 804(4) with Microsoft v. Motorola, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 60233 at *303. The High Court’s ruling on this point was found to be in error on appeal, though not
because it deviated from the U.S. decisions. [2018] EWCA Civ 2344 at para 121.
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used in other jurisdictions, even when the same SDO policy is being interpreted.
And, finally, courts in one jurisdiction may simply differ in their analysis from
those in other jurisdictions, thus leading to incompatible interpretations of the
same SDO policy.
6. National Law and Global Markets
The UK High Court (Patents) in Unwired Planet52 introduced yet another wrinkle
to the fabric of FRAND adjudication. In that case, Unwired Planet, the holder of
several SEPs covering 2G, 3G and 4G wireless telecom standards, had allegedly
offered to grant Huawei, a Chinese smartphone manufacturer, a worldwide
license under those SEPs. Huawei challenged the reasonableness of Unwired
Planet’s licensing offer and the parties commenced litigation in several countries,
including the UK. In the UK case, Huawei argued that it only wished to obtain a
license under Unwired Planet’s UK patents,53 and that Unwired Planet’s
insistence on a worldwide license was unreasonable.
In evaluating the reasonableness of Unwired Planet’s proffered license, the UK
court first observed that “the vast majority” of SEP licenses in the wireless
telecom industry, including all of the comparable licenses introduced at trial,
were granted on a worldwide basis, with only occasional exclusions. 54 Against
this backdrop, the court reasoned that “a licensor and licensee acting reasonably
and on a willing basis would agree on a worldwide licence”.55 In contrast, the
court found that country-by-country licensing, as proposed by Huawei, would be
extremely inefficient if not “madness”.56 Accordingly, the court ruled that, in this
case, a FRAND license was necessarily a worldwide license and that if Huawei did
not enter into a license agreement on the global FRAND terms dictated by the
court, it would suffer the entry of an injunction in the UK (a sizable market). 57
Once Huawei enters into that license agreement, it will be licensed across the
entire world at the rates set by the UK court. No further licenses will be needed,
and proceedings in all other jurisdictions will effectively be mooted.
The UK court’s decision in Unwired Planet raises the very real possibility that
national courts will feel increasingly entitled to set royalty rates for SEPs across
the globe. The implications of this trend could be material, as high stakes patent
litigation today is an inherently global enterprise with parallel actions brought in
a dozen or more jurisdictions.58 This localized power to affect global commercial
[2017] EWHC 711 (Pat) (Apr. 5, 2017).
Id. at para 524.
54 Ibid, at para 534. Some comparable licenses, for example, excluded China.
55 Ibid,at para 543.
56 Ibid, at para 543.
57 Ibid, at para 572, 807(18). A similar result was reached by the Landgericht Dü sseldorf in Saint Lawrence
Communications v. Vodafone, Landgericht Düsseldorf 4a O 73/14, 4a O126/14, 4a O 127/14, 4a O 128/14,
4a O 129/14, 4a O 130/14, 31 March 2016. In Vodafone, the SEP holder also offered the implementer a
worldwide license, which requested instead a n national license. In evaluating the SEP holder’s conduct
under Huawei v. ZTE, the lower court held that the offer for a worldwide license was FRAND compliant. See
Robin Jacob & Alexander Milner, Lessons from Huawei v. ZTE, 4iP Council Research Report, Oct. 2016, at 10,
http://www.4ipcouncil.com/news/latest-research-4ip-council-lessons-huawei-v-zte.
58 See, e.g., J. ELLIS, “Vringo and ZTE Go the Distance: An Infographic”, Intell. Asset Mgmt. Blog (Dec. 15,
2015), https://perma.cc/2MUJ-YY63 (describing litigation between Vringo and ZTE in twelve different
52
53
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relationships could embolden courts in particular jurisdictions to seek to attract
litigants based on their interpretations of certain key SDO policy provisions.
Thus, the interpretations of some jurisdictions might favor SEP holders,
attracting them to the courts of that jurisdiction much as U.S. patent holders
were once attracted to the patent-friendly District Court for the Eastern District
of Texas,59 and European patent holders are attracted to Germany, where
injunctive relief will often be granted in an expedited proceeding before patent
validity is adjudicated.60 By the same token, jurisdictions that gain reputations
for favoring implementers over SEP holders may find a dearth of SEP holders
seeking adjudication in their courts, but perhaps an increase in claims by
manufacturers of standardized products.
This state of affairs can lead to what is termed a “race to the courthouse”, as
litigants rush to file suit in the jurisdiction most favorable to their position. The
stakes in such races become even greater when any one court having jurisdiction
over the parties may issue an order (a so-called “anti-suit injunction”)
prohibiting the parties from maintaining an action in any other jurisdiction until
the issuing court has reached a decision.61 In effect, any country whose market is
large enough that the manufacturer is not willing to sacrifice it via an injunction
could leverage the threat of an injunction to force parties to enter into a global
agreement on the terms that its courts dictate.
These considerations may also shape the behavior of courts and institutions
within jurisdictions to mold their rules and procedure to attract litigation in a
“race to the bottom”.62 Thus, the potential for inconsistent judicial
interpretations of SDO policy provisions is likely to lead both to an unproductive
race to the courthouse among litigants and a race to the bottom among
jurisdictions.
7. A Lack of Precedent and Predictability
In today’s global economy, product markets span the globe and worldwide
product interoperability is increasingly expected in fields such as computing,
jurisdictions), K. EICHENWALD, “The Great Smartphone War”, Vanity Fair, May 3, 2014,
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2014/06/apple-samsung-smartphone-patent-war (describing
litigation between Apple and Samsung across a dozen jurisdictions).
59 See, e.g., B. J. LOVE & J. YOON, “Predictably Expensive: A Critical Look at Patent Litigation in the Eastern
District of Texas”, 20. Stanford Technology Law Review 2017, p. (1). The peculiar dominance of the E.D.Tex.
in U.S. patent litigation may be coming to an end following the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in TC
Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, 581 U.S. (2017). See R. DAVIS, “What We Know about Patent
Venue Post-TC Heartland”, Law360, May 23, 2018.
60 The readiness of German courts to issue injunctions to patent holders was tempered somewhat in the
case of SEPs subject to FRAND commitments by the Court of Justice of the EU in Huawei v. ZTE (n 27), in
which a SEP holder may be found to abuse its dominant position in violation of TFEU 102 if it seeks to
obtain an injunction when enforcing a FRAND-encumbered SEP without following a specified set of
procedural steps outlined by the CJEU.
61 See J. L. CONTRERAS & M. A. EIXENBERGER, “The Anti-Suit Injunction – A Transnational Remedy for MultiJurisdictional SEP Litigation” in CONTRERAS (n 3), pp. 451-459 (describing anti-suit injunctions in Microsoft v.
Motorola, Vringo v. ZTE and TCL v. Ericsson).
62 See, e.g., D. J. H. GREENWOOD, “Democracy and Delaware: The Mysterious Race to the Bottom/Top”, 23. Yale
Law & Policy Review, Issue 2, Art. 2 (2005) (discussing the view that the U.S. state Delaware adjusted its
corporate law to attract business incorporations). For a more detailed discussion of the potential impact of
these developments on global markets, see CONTRERAS (n 29).
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networking, content distribution and telecommunications. The SDOs that
develop standards to enable this degree of interoperability, by default, must
operate internationally. Their participants come from dozens of countries
around the world, particularly North America, Europe, Oceana, and Asia.63 In
many cases, the same individuals participate on behalf of their employers in
multiple SDOs developing similar technologies. Even SDOs such as ETSI, which
began as projects of regional or national governments have, by necessity,
expanded to encompass an international membership.
The physical headquarters location of SDOs has thus become increasingly
irrelevant to their operation and policy making. Why should the fact that one
SDO is legally based in New York and another is legally based in Geneva affect
the interpretation and enforcement of commitments made by the same
individuals on behalf of the same firms acting in the same technology space with
respect to the very same end products?
The examples discussed above illustrate that the national and state private law
mechanisms that purport to govern SDO patent policies are inconsistent and
sometimes at odds with one another. The result has been an interpretive
patchwork that allows room for opportunistic parties to engage in forum
shopping and makes planning more difficult for everyone else. Moreover, given
the different approaches taken by different jurisdictions to these issues, an
adjudication in one jurisdiction relating to a FRAND commitment is not likely to
assist with interpretation of that same commitment in another jurisdiction.
Given the global nature of markets for standardized products, this fragmentation
along national and state boundaries is particularly problematic.
What’s more, there is not even predictable interpretation of identical policy
provisions from one SDO to the next, even within the same country. That is, each
SDO purports to be an independent organization with a unique set of governing
documents and policies. As such, most SDOs feel free to disregard guidance and
interpretations of policy provisions that are issued by other SDOs. Some SDOs, in
fact, vehemently defend their independence in declining to follow the
interpretive lead of other SDOs, even where identical policy language is
concerned.
Can this fragmentation be efficient? Why should the term “non-discriminatory”
have different meanings depending on whether an SDO is based in New York or
Sophia-Antipolis, or whether the court adjudicating that meaning is located in
London or Milwaukee? This divergence is particularly senseless when the same
individuals interact at these different SDOs on a regular basis. A lack of
consistency in the interpretation of common SDO provisions, even noncontroversial ones, lends less predictability to the ordering of private affairs. The
lack of consistent understandings of SDO policy provisions may give rise to more
disputes regarding policy interpretation and result in less certainty regarding
See, e.g., J. L. CONTRERAS, “Divergent Patterns of Engagement in Internet Standardization: Japan, Korea and
China”, 38. Telecommunications Policy 2004, p. (916) (describing globalization of Internet standardization
and increasing engagement of Asian firms).
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the outcome of disputes. All of these lead to higher transaction and litigation
costs, thus disadvantaging smaller players.64
Finally, it seems unlikely that this fragmented system can accurately reflect the
understanding of individual SDO participants. Is it possible that these individuals
adjust their behavior depending on the interpretations given to nearly identical
SDO rules country by country, organization by organization? This cannot be the
way that individual SDO participants conduct themselves, yet this is the reality
imposed on them and their employers by the fragmented nature of private law
mechanisms that guide interpretation of SDO policies.
8. A Lex Mercatoria for Standardization?
Let us conduct a thought experiment. Suppose that two engineers, call them
Jacques and Mary, employed by different firms, each participate in two SDOs, one
based in the U.S. and the other based in France. The patent policies of these SDOs
are relatively similar. Further suppose that neither Jacques nor Mary is an
attorney or an expert in legal doctrine, but that each of them has many years of
experience developing technical standards and some familiarity with both the
principles of patent law and his or her own employer’s policies relating to
patents. Assuming that neither Jacques and Mary, nor their companies, are at the
moment embroiled in a dispute and view each other relatively neutrally, what
can we assume about their understanding of the SDOs’ policies relating to certain
topics?
Let us first consider the less controversial topics raised above. Would Jacques
and Mary agree that a FRAND commitment made with respect to a patent should
continue if the patent is sold to a new owner? While nothing is certain, it is likely
that they would agree that the FRAND commitment should, indeed, travel with
the patent, even if they know nothing about competition law or the law of
property servitudes. What about the ability of a third party who is not an SDO
member to enforce a FRAND commitment against a SEP holder? Again, it is
likely that our two engineer friends would agree that the implementer should be
able to insist that a SEP holder grant it a license on FRAND terms, even if they
know nothing about the convoluted law surrounding privity of contract or third
party contractual beneficiaries.
What about a more controversial topic? For example, the non-discrimination
prong of the FRAND commitment. Would they agree that charging one
implementer $0.05 per unit and another implementer $0.01 per unit for a license
is discriminatory? Perhaps they would. Or perhaps they, being thoughtful
engineers, would want to know more, such as the relative sizes or unit volumes
This is not to say, however, that SDOs should not be encouraged to experiment with their IPR policies.
Policy experimentation is a useful method for adapting policy terms to evolving needs of the industry. See,
e.g., BARTLEY (n 4), at 524 (“Private regulation may also be conceptualized as a laboratory of standards and
benchmarks to later be institutionalized in government regulation and law, another possible form of
complementarity” (citing C. F. SABEL & J. ZEITLIN, “Learning From Difference: The New Architectures of
Experimentalist Governance in the European Union”, 14. European Law Journal 2008, p. (271). Rather, the
critique of this article is differing external interpretations of the same policy provisions adopted by different
SDOs.
64
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sold by these two implementers, or whether their products serve different
markets (e.g., wireless connectivity in offices versus automobiles). Depending on
the answers to these questions, they might or might not agree on a common
position.65
From the answers to these questions, we can sequentially build up a common
body of understanding between Jacques and Mary as to many, but not all, issues.
It is likely that if more engineers, also from different firms, were asked, some of
them would agree with some of the common understandings of Jacques and
Mary. As a result, we could, in theory, develop a body of policy understandings
that is common across a large swath of the relevant stakeholders in the
standards-development community.66
This set of common understandings could be considered a sort of lex mercatoria
– a system of rules administered and interpreted not by national and state
courts, but by the expert practitioners of a particular trade.67 As such, the
common understanding of these policy provisions would supersede legal
interpretations imposed by national or state law. In fact, it would be reasonable
for legal tribunals to defer to such common trade understandings, as is
frequently done in the commercial context.68
What’s more, if we conceptualize the set of policy rules enabling the
development of standards across the globe as an interconnected network rather
than a multiplicity of isolated nodes, we can begin to adopt learning and
interpretation across SDOs, rather than compartmentalizing the interpretive
activity of each SDO within itself. Thus, an SDO that gives meaning to a term not
previously debated can, at minimum, influence the interpretive act of other SDOs
in the network and, at most, serve as a precedent directly bearing on other SDOs’
interpretation.
Of course, as noted above, uniformity will not be achievable as to every SDO
policy provision, and some contentious issues, such as the appropriate base for
FRAND royalty calculations, may remain disputed across SDOs. As a result,
different SDOs may adopt different meanings for these disputed terms through
whatever internal voting and consensus procedures they wish. Nevertheless, it
is likely that there is a significant body of SDO policy provisions that do not suffer
An actual example of SDO divergence on a controversial topic can be found with respect to the definition
of FRAND. As noted above, IEEE enacted policy amendments in 2015 which seek to clarify several aspects of
its participants’ FRAND commitments including the appropriate royalty base (SSPPU should be considered).
In contrast, CEN-CENELEC in recent policy guidelines has expressly declined to offer such interpretive
advice, taking the position instead that FRAND is a mere ‘comity device’ which cannot be specified in
advance.
66 For a discussion of the development of common understandings through the mechanism of “shared
meaning analysis” in the context of consumer contracts, see R. B. KAR & M. J. RADIN, “Pseudo-Contract &
Shared Meaning Analysis”, 132. Harvard Law Review 2019, p.(1135).
67 See, generally, H. J. BERMAN & C. KAUFMAN, “The Law of International Commercial Transactions (Lex
Mercatoria)”, 19. Harvard International Law Journal 1978, p. (221) (discussing origins and contemporary
application of lex mercatoria).
68 See L. L. JAFFE, "Law Making by Private Groups", 51. Harvard Law Review 1937, p. (201), at 213 (describing
how courts adopted customs and usages of merchants in adjudicating commercial transactions).
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from broad disagreement, and which could form the basis for a standardization
lex mercatoria.
9. Role of a lex mercatoria?
It is worth emphasizing that the envisioned lex mercatoria for standardization is
not intended to be a replacement for judicial or arbitral resolution of FRAND
disputes, but as a tool that can be employed by courts and arbitral tribunals in
resolving such disputes. Courts have, in the past, given weight to the intentions
of SDO participants when interpreting policy language that was ambiguous. In
some cases, participant understandings have even superseded the plain meaning
of policy language that did not reflect widely-held norms.69 The lex mercatoria of
standardization, were it to be adopted, could more easily enable adjudicators to
determine, without resort to national law, whether particular duties and
practices are imposed by SDO policies, clearing the way for them to evaluate
individual conduct in light of those common rules in a more consistent and
efficient manner.
This being said, a common set of understandings codified into a lex is not the
only way that greater consistency and predictability could be achieved in an
international setting. On the contrary. Greater harmonization of national judicial
interpretations could also serve this purpose, as could deference among national
courts to decisions made in other jurisdictions (akin to the international
recognition of arbitral awards under the New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.70 But, as desirable as
these international comity measures might be, such coordination does not
appear to be on the horizon in today’s political environment. Moreover, the
bringing together of national judicial approaches has far broader implications
than standardization and FRAND licensing. As such, it is suggested that the lex
mercatoria proposal in this paper, which concerns only the world of technical
standard setting, is far more modest than a call for broad systemic change at a
global level.
10. Codification and Implementation
The above discussion begs the question, of course, who would develop such a lex
mercatoria, and under what circumstances? Who are Jacques and Mary, and how
might we persuade them to engage in the exercise of codifying their common
understandings? As Cremades and Plehn observe, there are two basic
approaches to the establishment of a new international legal regime: the
harmonization of existing national laws, and the development of a new,
autonomous body of law.71 The harmonization approach has been used with
See, e.g., Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (literal reading of SDO policy
resulted in no duty of disclosure on SDO members, but testimony of various SDO participants showed that
even without a formal disclosure requirement, SDO participants shared a common understanding that they
should disclose patents necessary to practice the SDO’s standards, resulting in a legal duty); Qualcomm Inc.
v. Broadcom Corp., 548 F.3d 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding similar duty to disclose patents based on
informal norms and expectations of SDO participants). See also CONTRERAS (n.1) at 218-220.
70 U.N. Comm. on Intl. Trade Law, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (New York, 1958).
71 See CREMADES & PLEHN (n 7), at 321.
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varying degrees of success in the area of intellectual property law. Broadly
adopted treaties such as the TRIPS Agreement72 have shaped the IP laws of most
developed countries, but the process of negotiating an international treaty is
complex, lengthy and resource-intensive, and has only become more so in recent
years. Accordingly, this approach is not recommended in the current instance.
Looking to the roots of the lex mercatoria itself – the customary code of merchant
law – we find the development of an autonomous body of doctrine that existed
independently of formal law. Its origins have been traced to the organized
mercantile markets and fairs that began to emerge in eleventh century Europe.73
The body of commercial practices and norms developed by merchants in their
transactions diverged in important ways from then-existing legal doctrines, but
were widely observed among transacting parties.74 Eventually, the norms
developed by these private actors were recognized by courts in adjudicating
disputes: first among merchants and then in commercial transactions more
broadly.75 Numerous other examples of such private transactional codes have
been studied, including those adopted by Hassidic diamond wholesalers,76
Memphis cotton merchants,77 credit rating agencies,78 and Internet technology
users,79 to name just a few.
These examples suggest that for a private code to achieve both acceptance and
legitimacy in the eyes of both its adherents and the broader legal system, it
should be developed and adopted organically by those to whom it is applied, as
opposed to some external body.80 Accordingly, the proposed lex mercatoria of
standardization should arise from the usage and custom of the standardsdevelopment community. In fact, as illustrated by the example of Jacques and
Mary in the previous Section, it is likely that this common understanding already
exists in practice, and merely requires codification to be preserved and utilized
effectively by courts, arbitrators and other adjudicatory bodies.
This being said, industry custom cannot be the only criteria by which a private
code is judged. The question of legitimacy is particularly important if a private
code of conduct is to be adopted by the legal system. Without a doubt, there are
private codes that may govern behavior of their adherents (e.g., the Sicilian
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (1995).
See CREMADES & PLEHN (n 7), at 318 fn.2 (collecting historical references); BERMAN & KAUFMAN (n 67), at 225.
74 See CREMADES & PLEHN (n 7), at 319.
75 See BERMAN & KAUFMAN (n 67), at 226; JAFFE (n 68), at 213; CREMADES & PLEHN (n 7), at 319-20.
76 L. BERNSTEIN, “Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry”,
21. Journal of Legal Studies 1992, p. (115).
77 L. BERNSTEIN, “Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules,
Norms, and Institutions”, 99. Michigan Law Review 2001, p. (1724).
78 S. L. SCHWARCZ, “Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox”, University of Illinois Law
Review 2002, p. (1).
79 See M. A. LEMLEY, “The Law and Economics of Internet Norms”, 73. Chicago-Kent Law Review 1998, p.
(1257), 1263-1264.
80 It is worth noting that while the standards engineers who would contribute to a lex mercatoria are, to a
large degree, technically sophisticated, the instant proposal is not one of expert, technocratic regulation,
which is a subject of some debate. See, e.g., C. M. RADAELLI, Technocracy in the European Union (London:
Routledge 1999). In this case, it is merely coincidental that the regulated group itself consists largely of
“technocratic” individuals.
72
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Mafia’s unwritten “omerta” code of silence), but which are viewed as illegitimate
by society more broadly, not to mention the legal system.81 Clearly, in order to
achieve external legitimacy, a private code must hew to applicable legal rules
and norms. As noted by Jaffe, such codes must be “pronounced by a court to be
‘reasonable’ and comfortable to the general law” and cannot simply reflect the
desires of private actors.82
In the context of open source code software, Dan Wielsch has observed a
concerted effort by the open source community to embody a set of “peculiar
ethical imperatives” into the licensing agreements promulgated by the Free
Software Foundation (FSF).83 The FSF’s gesture toward a transnational lex
contractus is deliberate, Wielsch argues, as it “uses a vocabulary that deliberately
eschews terms of art in international copyright law in order to avoid the
importation of system-specific legal assumption” and instead adopts “a language
that incorporates and faithfully conveys the normativity of technological
engineering projects.”84
Who, then, can be trusted with the codification effort in the context of technical
standards? Could a particular SDO play the role that FSF has played with regard
to the open source community? Probably not. As noted above, there is a
diversity of viewpoints and backgrounds within SDOs, making it more likely that
true industry consensus would only be achieved through an effort that spanned
SDOs. Moreover, the act of codification is, at heart, a legal activity, so it would be
preferable for the codification effort to include at least some participants with
legal backgrounds. These considerations point to an industry activity organized
by a neutral body that has at least some level of legal capability.
Who, then, can be trusted with this codification effort? A particular SDO?
Probably not. As noted above, there is a diversity of viewpoints and backgrounds
within SDOs, making it more likely that true industry consensus would be
achieved through an effort that spanned SDOs. Moreover, the act of codification
is, at heart, a legal activity, so it would be preferable for the codification effort to
include at least some participants with legal backgrounds. These considerations
point to an industry activity organized by a neutral body that has at least some
level of legal credibility.
Neutrality is particularly important for the codifying body, as the proposed lex
mercatoria would, in some ways, supersede decision making by the
democratically sanctioned national judiciary. As such, the lex should not be
biased toward any particular industry position, but should embody only those
positions that reflect broad consensus within the standardization community.
Capture of the codifying body by particular interests (e.g., by firms that primarily
seek to monetize patent assets, or by firms that primarily manufacture products
See, e.g., C. J. MILHAUPT & M. D. WEST, “The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An Institutional and Empirical
Analysis of Organized Crime”, 67. University of Chicago Law Review 2000, p. (41).
82 JAFFE (n 68), at 214.
83 D. WIELSCH, “Contract Interpretation Regimes”, 81. Modern Law Review 2018, p. (958), at 985.
84 Ibid., at 986.
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without R&D effort) would seriously compromise the perceived validity and
acceptability of the resulting code.
Examples of bodies that might be both qualified and neutral in this regard
include the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), which recently
developed a set of arbitral procedures for FRAND disputes,85 the American Bar
Association (ABA), which has developed an annotated set of SDO policy
provisions,86 and the International Chamber of Commerce, which developed the
international commercial code known as INCOTERMS.87 Each of these bodies
appears to possess the necessary levels of expertise, industry contacts and, at
least in some respects, neutrality, to lead the codification effort.88
One important feature of the lex mercatoria approach is that, once developed, it
need not be formally adopted or approved by SDOs, which in many cases have
proven to be contentious and mired in internal debate. Rather, the lex can exist
outside of any particular SDO, and can be available for reference by SDOs that are
interested. Of course, any SDO that strongly opposes a term or definition
contained in the lex can adopt a policy statement affirmatively rejecting that
term or definition, or adopting a contrary meaning of its own. But doing so does
not diminish the value of the lex. In fact, the existence of such contrary
statements by dissenting SDOs could serve to strengthen the force of the lex
among the larger group of non-dissenting SDOs. And, if enough SDOs and SDO
participants object to a particular term in the lex, there should be some way to
revise or strike the term as inconsistent with a broad industry understanding.
Another pertinent question is how such a lex mercatoria would be used once
developed. It could intervene in the legal system in a number of ways: as a more
or less authoritative input to existing adjudicatory processes, or as a body of
adjudicative principles of its own, administered and enforced outside national
judicial processes, perhaps through an industry-based transnational tribunal of
some kind.89 In the former case, of course, enforcement by national courts again
gives rise to the possibility of divergent application of even the common
vocabulary established by the lex mercatoria, but perhaps at least some degree of
consistency can be achieved for the most vexing doctrinal debates in this area.
After all, the historical adoption of the original lex mercatoria by English courts
in the eighteenth century and the tendency of modern courts to defer to
commercial practices such as the definitions offered by INCOTERMS indicate that

85See

WORLD
INTELLECTUAL
PROP.
ORG.,
WIPO
ADR
for
FRAND
Disputes,
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/center/specific-sectors/ict/frand/ (visited Jul. 9, 2018).
86 ABA PATENT POLICY MANUAL (n 13) (the author led this project).
87 INCOTERMS is a good example of an industry-generated code that is adopted and referenced by courts
around the world. It consists of a set of defined commercial terms specifying the delivery, payment and
insurance obligations of parties to commercial shipping arrangements. See, generally, J. RAMBERG,
INCOTERMS 2010, 13. European Journal of Law Reform 2011, p. (380).
88 A significant practical question may be precisely how such an activity would be funded, but this point is
beyond the scope of this paper.
89 See J. L. CONTRERAS, “Global Rate-Setting: A Solution for Standards-Essential Patents?” 94. Washington Law
Review
2019,
forthcoming,
(prepublication
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3253954).
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courts may, under the right circumstances, permit private actors to establish the
terms of their commercial interactions.
Even more promising is the prospect of truly international enforcement and
adjudication of such SDO-related disputes, a situation that is partially achieved
through current international arbitration, albeit in a private and non-transparent
manner.90 The author has proposed such a system, at least for the determination
of FRAND royalty rates on a global basis.91 But the actual implementation of
such a system is less important than the vision of a unified body of policy that it
invites.
11. Conclusion
Technical standardization plays an important role in the global economy, yet the
rules that govern this activity are subject to inconsistent interpretations by
different national courts leading to market inefficiencies. Given the increasing
divergence of national and organizational policy interpretations and
understandings in the standardization world, a common base of understanding
driven by SDO participants rather than courts and policy makers could be an
attractive solution. Such a lex mercatoria of standardization could serve as an
input to national courts as well as international arbitral tribunals, providing a
consensus view of certain debated SDO policy provisions that is independent of
the vagaries of national law.

90
91

See ibid (discussing weaknesses in current arbitral resolution of FRAND disputes).
See ibid.
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